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CONSTRUCTION LAW
Daniel L. Fitch*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines changes in the statutes affecting the area
of construction law made by the General Assembly of Virginia in
1988 and 1989. This article will also examine judicial decisions
from 1987, 1988 and the first half of 1989 that have affected con-
struction law in the Commonwealth.
Construction law is still an area where the parties primarily gov-
ern themselves through contract provisions.1 The General Assem-
bly and the judiciary of Virginia continue to largely leave parties in
privity to their own devices vis-a-vis the written contract between
them. The main function of the General Assembly and courts is to
enforce the relevant contracts or, in certain cases, to prevent the
expansion of liability of the parties to those beyond the privity of
the contract. One of the few areas of activism for the legislature
and courts in the field of construction law has been to regulate
those qualified to be contractors, subcontractors, architects, etc.,
and to protect the public in certain areas.
II. LEGISLATION
The General Assembly normally makes relatively few changes
affecting the relationship between parties in a construction con-
tract. Since construction law is so dominated by the contractual
relationships of the parties involved in the respective projects, the
main thrust of the legislation affecting this area has generally been
to set certain standards and procedures to protect the state and
* Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, Harrisonburg, Virginia; B.S., 1978, United States Mili-
tary Academy; J.D., 1986, University of Virginia School of Law; Professional Engineer; Cap-
tain, USAR, Corps of Engineers.
The author gratefully acknowledges the able research assistance of G. Chris Brown, B.A.,
1987, Bridgewater College; Candidate for J.D., May, 1990, University of Virginia School of
Law.
1. See, e.g., C & P Telephone v. Sisson & Ryan, Inc., 234 Va. 492, 362 S.E.2d 723 (1987).
The Supreme Court of Virginia said, "[w]e are committed to the view that parties may
contract as they so choose so long as what they agree to is not forbidden by law or against
public policy." Id at 503, 362 S.E.2d at 729.
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the public as opposed to the regulation of the contracting parties
themselves.
A. The 1988 General Assembly
1. The Virginia Public Procurement Act2
The General Assembly amended the procedure for the procure-
ment of design-build or construction management contracts by
public bodies. The statute now requires offerors to supply their
qualifications to the Commonwealth.' Also, the Commonwealth
may now only choose up to five offerors to submit proposals for the
contract.4 Under the proper circumstances, construction manage-
ment contracts can result in substantial savings to the owner while
in other circumstances, it is to the owner's advantage to look to the
contractor as both the building and design professional. The 1988
changes streamline the procurement process for design-build or
construction management contracts by requiring qualifications to
be established prior to bidding.
2. Subdivision Ordinances
The 1988 General Assembly enacted a major change in the code
sections regulating subdivision ordinances by adding a provision
designed to assist subdivision developers who pay for the road im-
provements they perform.' This section provides that a subdivision
ordinance may include a provision reimbursing a developer who
performs reasonable and necessary improvements outside his prop-
erty limits.6 The work must be "substantially generated and rea-
sonably required by the construction or improvement of his subdi-
vision or development" and approved by the locality's governing
body in order to qualify for annual reimbursements from the local-
ity.8 This should diminish the localities' cost for road improve-
ments since they can now reimburse the developers for improve-
ments instead of having to contract with road builders to do the
work. This change should also increase the developers' incentive to
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
3. Id. § 11-41.2(B).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 15.1-466(E).
6. Id.
7. Id § 15.1-466(E).
8. Id. § 15.1-466(E)(a).
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make quality improvements since they will be reimbursed for the
work.
The subdivision code provisions were also amended to allow a
subdivision ordinance to require developers to pay their pro-rata
share of any cost incurred for off-site water improvements.' This
ordinance merely added water improvements to the pre-existing
requirement for pro-rata payments by developers for sewage and
drainage improvements. 10 This will help keep the localities' cost
down by making the developers pay for improvements made neces-
sary by the developers' construction.
3. Housing
The General Assembly amended the code in order to include
nursing care facilities and nursing homes under the Virginia Hous-
ing Authorities Law.1' Section 36-47 of the Code of Virginia" was
amended to include any nursing care facility or any nursing home
as defined in section 32.1-1231 as a residential building as used in
the chapter. Section 36-55.2614 goes even further, stating that for
the purpose of the Virginia Housing Development Act, 15 housing
developments, housing project, and residential housing include
medical and related facilities for the residence and care of the
aged. These changes give the housing authorities around the state
the authority to supervise the construction, repair, and alteration
of nursing facilities in the Commonwealth. 16
9. Id. § 15.1-466(A)(j).
10. Id.
11. Id. §§ 36-1 to 36-55.6 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
12. Id. 8 36-47.
13. Id. § 32.1-123 (Repl. Vol. 1985). This section provides that:
'Nursing home' means any facility or any identifiable component of any facility in
which the primary function is the provision, on a continuing basis, of nursing services
and health-related services for the treatment and inpatient care of two or more
nonrelated individuals, including facilities known by varying nomenclature or desig-
nation such as convalescent homes, skilled care facilities, intermediate care facilities,
extended care facilities and infirmaries.
Id.
14. Id. § 36-55.26 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
15. Id. §8 36-55.24 to -55.52 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
16. Id. §8 36-19, -55.30.
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4. Contractors
The 1988 General Assembly made several amendments to the
code specifically directed at the construction industry. Two of
these should have relatively little impact on the construction in-
dustry as a whole. Now, it is not necessary to be licensed as an
architect or professional engineer in order to prepare the plans for
churches with an occupancy load of 100 or fewer.'" The legislature
also provided for the publication of a roster containing the names
and places of business of all licensed and registered contractors
which would be available at cost to any interested party.I8
In an amendment which may have slightly more important im-
pact on the industry, the definition of judgment under the Con-
tractor Transaction Recovery Act 9 was expanded. A judgment now
includes "an order of a United States Bankruptcy Court declaring
a claim against a regulant who is in bankruptcy to be a 'debt non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy.' ",20 Now, even if a claim against a
bankrupt contractor has not been reduced to a judgment by a Vir-
ginia court of competent jurisdiction, a claimant can still use the
Virginia Contractor Transaction Recovery Act's recovery provision
if the claim has been declared non-dischargeable in a United
States Bankruptcy Court.2' This will allow a claimant to eliminate
the wasteful step of having to secure a judgment from a Virginia
court when the merits of the claim have already been decided in a
United States Bankruptcy Court.
In 1988, the General Assembly tightened its regulation of asbes-
tos concerns in the construction industry. As of January 1, 1989, a
local building department cannot issue a building permit to reno-
vate or demolish a building constructed before 1978 until the
building has been inspected by a licensed inspector who deter-
mines that either no asbestos is present or that the appropriate
abatement action has been taken.22 Similarly, beginning July 1,
1989, an asbestos inspection and abatement plan, if necessary, is
required for the issue or renewal of licenses for hospitals23 or child-
17. Id. § 54.1-402(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
18. Id. § 54.1-1105.
19. Id. §§ 54.1-1118 to -1127.
20. Id. § 54.1-1118.
21. Id. § 54.1-1120.
22. Id. § 36-99.7 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
23. Id. § 32.1-126.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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care centers24 built before 1978.
The General Assembly also amended the chapter of the code
which affects asbestos contractors and workers.25 The chapter's
definitions were expanded in order to allow the Department of
Commerce to regulate the issuance of licenses to supervisors, in-
spectors, and project designers working with the control and abate-
ment of asbestos.26 The legislature also amended the code to allow
the Department of Commerce the discretion to waive the require-
ment for an asbestos supervisor's license in an emergency involving
an unplanned renovation or demolition.27
B. The 1989 General Assembly
1. The Virginia Public Procurement Act 28
In 1989, the General Assembly made several amendments to the
Virginia Public Procurement Act which affect the construction in-
dustry. In order to keep up with the rising cost of construction, the
legislature increased the minimum amount needed for sealed bids
on competitive negotiations to $15,000.00.29 The amount had been
$10,000.00 since sections 11-41 and 11-41.1 were enacted in 1982.30
This amount was undoubtedly increased in order to maintain flexi-
bility and decreased formality in awarding small construction
contracts.
The General Assembly also made an addition to section 11-56
which allows contractors working for political subdivisions to re-
ceive interest on retainage.31 Under the current section 11.56, the
contractor in any public construction contract is paid ninety-five
percent of his fee when due.32 The remaining five percent is re-
tained to assure faithful performance of the remainder of the con-
tract.3 3 The amendment to section 11-56 allows the retainage to be
placed in an interest bearing escrow account chosen by the con-
24. Id. § 63.1-198.01 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
25. Id. § 54.1-500 to -517 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
26. Id. § 54.1-500.
27. Id. § 54.1-512.
28. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
29. Id. §§ 11-41, -41.1.
30. Id. §§ 11-41, -41.1 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
31. Id. § 11-56.1 (RepI. Vol. 1989).
32. Id. § 11-56 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
33. Id.
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tractor until the construction is finished. 4 The amendment also al-
lows the locality involved to collect a penalty for a late completion
of the contract.3 5 This is a sensible addition to the statute in that
the contractor gets the interest value of the money retained by the
locality to assure good performance. Allowing the locality to assess
a penalty for lateness, however, could result in increased litigation
between localities and contractors as to when the locality can actu-
ally charge the penalty.
Finally, the legislature amended the Virginia Public Procure-
ment Act to expand the accessibility of alternative forms of secur-
ity available in section 11-61(B). 6 A bidder is now allowed to "fur-
nish a personal bond, or bank or savings and loan association's
letter of credit on certain designated funds in the face amount re-
quired for the payment bond or performance bond upon the ap-
proval by the Attorney General of the attorney for the political
subdivision.""1 This should ease the difficulty in securing payment
or performance bonds, thereby enlarging the pool of potential con-
tractors from which localities may draw while still retaining some
security of faithful performance.
In 1989, the Virginia General Assembly made several changes to
the code to encourage construction in industry and housing. In an
action to help encourage industrial development, the legislature
authorized local governments and political subdivisions to partici-
pate in a program in which funds would be available to help con-
struct shell buildings for industry and related uses. 8
Because of the rapid growth in certain urban areas of the state,
the legislature took steps in 1989 to deal with current and poten-
tial housing problems. Three additions were made to section 15.1-
4919 to allow certain high growth areas in the state to amend their
zoning ordinances. These additions to section 15.1-491 give certain
localities the power to allow increased development in heavily
populated areas if the construction is for affordable housing.4
The 1989 General Assembly continued its already strict regula-
tion of asbestos by specifying that it is illegal for anyone not li-
34. Id. § 11-56.1 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 11-61(B).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 15.1-18.4.
39. Id. § 15.1-491.
40. Id. §§ 15-491.2:1, -491.8.
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censed to do so by the Department of Commerce to enter into a
contract to work on an asbestos project.4' This bill also provided
that the Department of Commerce shall develop training require-
ments for workers involved in asbestos work.42
Finally, the legislature passed a law specifically directed at con-
tractors. Contractors who violate State Board of Health water reg-
ulations will now risk having their licenses suspended or revoked
and possibly face up to a $1,000.00 fine.43
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Responsibilities of the Owner
Most jurisdictions, including Virginia, recognize the rule that an
owner who supplies plans and specifications for a particular con-
struction project impliedly warrants their correctness and bears re-
sponsibility for extra cost incurred by other parties of the contract
due to the insufficiency of those plans.44 Virginia has been most
chary in allowing disclaimers by the owner in order to circumvent
this rule, commonly known as the Spearin doctrine. 45 Thus in
Chantilly Construction Corp. v. Department of Highways and
Transportation,46 the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a gen-
erally worded disclaimer concerning any change in the specifica-
tions was ineffective when the contractor changed the specification
due to defects in the plans supplied by the owner.47 In the absence
of negligence on the contractor's part, he will not be liable for
losses or damages resulting from mistakes in the plans or specifica-
tions supplied by the owner.48
In dictum, the court of appeals implied in Chantilly that a dis-
claimer for an owner's warranty of adequacy of specifications could
be approved with specific language and evidence of additional con-
41. Id. § 54.1-503 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Supp. 1989).
42. Id. § 54.1-501(A)(3) (Supp. 1989).
43. Id. § 54.1-1106.1.
44. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918); see also Southgate v. Sanford & Brooks
Co., 147 Va. 554, 137 S.E. 485 (1927) (adopting the Spearin doctrine).
45. See, e.g., Greater Richmond Civic Recreation, Inc. v. A. H. Eqing's Sons, Inc., 200 Va.
593, 595-96, 106 S.E.2d 595, 596-97 (1959). The court held that a clause guaranteeing mater-
ials, workmanship and equipment were held ambiguous enough to present a jury question as
to the contractors' liability. Id.
46. 6 Va. App. 282, 369 S.E.2d 438 (1988).
47. Id. at 293-94, 369 S.E.2d at 444-45.
48. Id. at 292, 369 S.E.2d at 444.
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sideration for the assumption of the burden by the contractor.4"
The court in Chantilly, however, rightfully refused to find such an
agreement based on a generally worded contract provision, instead
impliedly maintaining the viability of the Spearin doctrine in Vir-
ginia." This reasonably keeps the burden on the owner, who in
these situations is better able to ensure the adequacy of the plans
he or she provides than is the contractor.
Another area in which an owner may face liability, despite trying
to contract out of it, is personal injuries to employees. In Virginia,
the "special employer" rule is still used to determine which of two
employers is responsible for workman's compensation benefits paid
to an injured employee." The Court of Appeals of Virginia re-
cently applied the special employer rule in V.P.L v. Frye.2 V.P.I.
was held to be a special employer of a worker supplied through a
contract with a labor broker.5 3 Even though the workman was ac-
tually employed by the labor broker, V.P.I. had day to day contact
with him and directed his activities. This was enough control to
hold V.P.I. liable as a special employer. 4
The effect of V.P.I. could be to subject active owners who exer-
cise control over employees of the contractors or subcontractors on
the worksite to liability for injuries suffered by any of those em-
ployees. As demonstrated by V.P.I., even if an employee is hired,
paid, and generally controlled by a contractor or subcontractor,
49. Id. at 295, 369 S.E.2d at 445.
50. Id.
51. See Ideal Steam Laundry v. Williams, 153 Va. 176, 149 S.E. 479 (1929). The court
explained that the special employer rule is borrowed from the common law since Virginia's
Workman's Compensation Act does not address special employers or loaned employees. Id.
at 179, 149 S.E. at 480-81. The special employer rule establishes that the loaned employee
must be compensated by the special employer when injured performing the special em-
ployer's work. Id. at 181-82, 149 S.E. at 481.
52. 6 Va. App. 589, 371 S.E.2d 34 (1988).
53. Id. at 596, 371 S.E.2d at 38. The court of appeals expressly declined to recognize the
"labor broker-exception" which states that an employer who is in the sole business of pro-
viding temporary labor and who agrees with its customers to be liable for worker's compen-
sation is liable should an employee be injured working for a customer of the employer. Id. at
593, 371 S.E.2d at 36-37. The court stated that while it is a logical rule, the Virginia Work-
ers Compensation Act, sections 65.1-1 to -7 does not provide for it. Id. at 594-95, 371 S.E.2d
at 36-37.
54. Id. at 593, 371 S.E.2d at 36. The court examined four elements from master-servant
law to determine which party was the special employer. These were: (1) selection and hiring
of the servant; (2) payment of his or her wages; (3) power of dismissal, and (4) power of
control of the servant's actions. Id. The court stated that control is the dominating factor
since whoever directs the actions of the employee should be responsible for his or her com-
pensation for injuries. Id.
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any day to day control by the owner could render the owner a spe-
cial employer and, therefore, at least initially, the owner would be
liable for workman's compensation for the injured workers.5 5 This
also raises questions concerning situations in which the architect,
under his contract with the owner, actively supervises the con-
struction of projects. It seems possible that the architect's contrac-
tual relationship with the owner could make the owner liable for
an employee's injuries if the architect has any direct control over
the employees in the context of his supervision.
B. The Contractual Relationship Between the Owner and
Architect
The relationship between an owner and an architect arises from
and is governed by the contract between the two parties .5 Because
of the detail required of the contract, and the potential liability
involved for the parties, the standard form contracts of the Ameri-
can Institute of Architects (AIA) have become invaluable to the
contracting process. Despite the availability of standard, compre-
hensive forms which can be tailored to fit the specific needs of a
particular project, conflicts often arise between the owner and ar-
chitect.57 The courts' main function in this area has been to inter-
pret the contract when problems arise and to maintain the privity
of contract. In Nelson v. Commonwealth,58 a case addressing a host
of issues between owners and architects, the court initially stated
that in every employment contract between an owner and an archi-
tect, it is implicit that unless there is a clause in the contract to
the contrary, the architect has a duty to exercise the care of those
ordinarily skilled in the profession.59 An architect must exercise
this same standard of care in the administration of the construc-
tion as well.60 In an action for architectural malpractice, while the
issues of the architect's failures and shortcomings are indeed jury
questions, architecture is sufficiently technical as to require expert
55. Id. at 595-96, 371 S.E.2d at 38-39. The court stated that there was nothing to prevent
the special employer from contracting to have the other employer procure insurance for the
workers. However, under Virginia Workman's Compensation Act, the special employer had
the responsibility to initially pay compensation to an injured employee, if the payment
would otherwise be delayed due to adjudication. Id.
56. Blake Construction Co. v. Alley, 233 Va. 31, 34, 353 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1987).
57. See, e.g., Nelson v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 228, 368 S.E.2d 239 (1988).
58. 235 Va. 228, 368 S.E.2d 239 (1988).
59. Id. at 235, 368 S.E.2d at 243 (citing Surfrealty Corp. v. Standing, 195 Va. 431, 442-43,
78 S.E.2d 901, 907 (1953)).
60. Id. at 236, 368 S.E.2d at 243.
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testimony." The Nelson court reversed the owner's award on its
architects' malpractice claim and entered final judgment, holding
that without expert testimony, an accurate standard of care could
not be relayed to the jury.2
Once problems do arise, an owner's cause of action for improper
design accrues at the time the plans are approved by the owner. 3
An owner must bring his or her action within five years6 after the
approval of the plans even if the architect continues in the employ-
ment of the owner because most owner-architect contracts are sev-
erable as distinguished from continuous or recurring.",
C. The Relationship Between the Owner and General Contractor
The relationship between an owner and a general contractor is
also very much contractual in nature and is largely governed by
the terms of standard form contracts such as those developed by
the AIA. Despite the highly contractual nature of the relationship
between the owner and general contractor, there are certain extra-
contractual rights and responsibilities which must be considered.
As previously mentioned, an owner impliedly warrants that the
plans and specifications the owner provides to the general contrac-
tor will be accurate.66 Additionally, if an owner exercises too much
direct control over employees of the contractor, the owner could be
held liable for workmen's compensation paid to injured
employees. 7
Generally, however, the contractual nature of the relationship
between owners and contractors provides a certain amount of flexi-
bility for the parties to contract around some of the statutory pro-
visions and general customs of the construction industry.68 Thus,
in Board of Supervisors v. Sampson,69 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that two parties could contractually establish a short-
61. Id. at 238, 368 S.E.2d at 244-45. The court adopted the general rule of most jurisdic-
tions that architecture does require expert testimony to establish the standard of care. Id.
62. Id. at 241, 368 S.E.2d at 246.
63. Id. at 242, 368 S.E.2d at 247.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(2) (Repl. Vol. 1984). This statute provides for a five year
statute of limitations for a written contract.
65. 235 Va. at 242-44, 368 S.E.2d at 242-44.
66. See supra notes 44-50.
67. See supra notes 51-55.
68. See, e.g., Blue Cross v. McDevitt & Street Co., 234 Va. 191, 360 S.E.2d 825 (1987).
The parties contractually shifted the risk of loss from themselves to a third party insurer.
69. 235 Va. 516, 369 S.E.2d 178 (1988)
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ened limitation period if the length of time is not unconscionable
or unreasonably short.70 An owner who decides to contract out of
certain responsibilities or to alter statutory provisions or construc-
tion industry customs should be alert to the general rule that con-
tract provisions of this sort must be expressly worded and very
specific in their intent.7 1 Whenever the parties deviate from stat-
utes or generally accepted construction customs there is a strong
possibility that a court will either not enforce or will misinterpret
the nonconforming clause unless it is in very specific language. The
courts in Virginia seem to have struck an effective balance in al-
lowing the parties some flexibility in their contract negotiations
while still retaining some strictness in language requirements in or-
der to protect the parties.
In an important decision concerning a number of previously un-
decided issues, the court in McDevitt & Street Co. v. Marriott
Corp.7 12 addressed differing site conditions clauses and delays and
time extensions clauses. The contractor had agreed to construct a
hotel for Marriott, but was almost nineteen weeks late in complet-
ing the contract. Allocating the blame for the numerous delays and
alleged alterations in connection with the site conditions was at the
heart of this suit.73 The contractor asserted that it was entitled to
compensation for extra work due to differing site soil conditions
principally on the grounds that the owner misled them with re-
spect to the actual conditions of the soil on the project by failing to
provide a second soils report which allegedly presaged the
problems later encountered by the contractor.74 The court, after
acknowledging that this was a contract in which time was of the
essence, ruled that the contract, which constitutes the law that
governs the parties' relationship, should not be disturbed where an
agreement is complete on its face, and is plain and unambiguous in
its terms.7 5 Given that the contract clearly placed the risk of unan-
ticipated soil conditions squarely on the contractor, the court de-
cided that the contractor was not entitled to additional compensa-
70. Id. at 520, 369 S.E.2d at 180.
71. See Chantilly Constr. Corp. v. Department of Highways & Transp., 6 Va. App. 282,
369 S.E.2d 438 (1988) (a generally worded waiver was held not effective); McMerit Constr.
Co. v. Knightsbridge Dev. Co., 235 Va. 368, 367 S.E.2d 512 (1988) (a "contractors' affidavit"
signed by contractor and stating that the contractor had received all payments due for work
performed was held not an express waiver of liens).
72. No. 88-102-A, slip op. (E.D. Va. May 1, 1989 as amended May 28, 1989).
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 2.
75. Id. at 7.
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tion simply because the actual soil conditions created unforeseen
difficulties. 6 The court also ruled that weather-caused soil condi-
tions were not a basis for this changed site condition claim as they
could have been reasonably anticipated.7 It is important to recog-
nize in interpreting this decision that the parties, through their
contract, could not have been clearer in expressing their intent
that the risk of differing soil conditions remained on the contrac-
tor.7 8 Without the very specific language in this agreement, a gen-
eral disclaimer of site conditions might have resulted in a quite
different outcome. 9
The McDevitt court also addressed the issue of "no damage for
delay" clauses. The contractor, inter alia, sought to recover dam-
ages for an alleged delay by the owner in providing electrical util-
ity service. In what is believed to be the first recognition of the
validity of a "no damages for delay" clause in Virginia, the court
held that such clauses are generally enforceable. s0 The court ruled
that because there was no evidence that any delay by the owner
was unreasonable, intentional or fraudulent the clause as written
should be enforced."' This language seems to suggest the court's
willingness to carve out a bad faith exception to enforcing similar
clauses in Virginia.
The McDevitt court also addressed the owner's counterclaim in
which it sought both direct and out-of-pocket expenses and conse-
quential damages. The court noted that the measure of damages
under Virginia law for the late completion of commercial property
is either the rental value of the completed structure for the delay
period or a reasonable return for that period on the completed
structure treated as an investment.82 In addition to permitting
76. Id.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 7.
79. See, e.g., Chantilly Constr. Corp v. Department of Highways & Transp., 6 Va. App.
282, 369 S.E.2d 438 (1988).
80. McDevitt, No. 88-102-A, slip op. at 15.
81. The clause provided, in pertinent part that:
Owner, its agents and employees shall not be held responsible for any loss or damage
sustained by Contractor, or additional costs incurred by Contractor, through delay
caused by Owner or its agents and employees, or any other Contractor or Subcontrac-
tor, or by abnormal weather conditions, or by any other clause, and Contractor agrees
not to make, and hereby waives, any claim for damages, and agrees that the sole right
and remedy therefore shall be an extension of time.
Id. at 33.
82. Id. at 26.
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these damages caused by the delay, the court also awarded the
owner the administrative expenses which were a direct result of
the extended construction period consisting of site administration,
travel, site security, temporary telephone, field office supplies and
bonds and insurance expenses."s
D. The Relationship Between the General and Subcontractor
The relationship between a general contractor and a subcontrac-
tor is at once one of the most valuable and potentially frustrating
associations in the construction field. 4 One of the first areas in
which problems can develop between the contractor and subcon-
tractor is at the bidding stage. In Piland Corp. v. REA Construc-
tion Co., 5 the United States District Court for Eastern Virginia
entertained some of the questions concerning a subcontractor's bid
and a contractor's reliance thereon. Even when parties are bidding
over the telephone, there must be an offer and an acceptance in
order to form a binding contract.86 However, when the acceptance
of a bid or offer is by telephone, the party asserting it bears the
burden of proof.8" Trade customs of the building industry may also
be admitted into evidence to explain or supplement the agreement
of the parties.8 8
Contractors frequently require subcontractors to secure perform-
ance bonds in order to protect against defaults and other
problems. The contractor must be careful to follow the principal
contract closely or the surety could be excused from performance
of the obligation to pay.89 In Southwood Builders, Inc. v. Peerless
Insurance Co.,90 a subcontractor, after supplying a performance
bond, fell behind in his work to the extent his termination would
have been justified.91 Instead of terminating the subcontractor, the
83. Id. at 29.
84. See, e.g., infra notes 90-93.
85. 672 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Va. 1987).
86. Id. at 246 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Keyser, 166 W. Va. 456, 275 S.E.2d 289 (1981);
Bernstein v. Bord, 146 Va. 670, 675-76, 132 S.E. 698, 699 (1926); Green v. Smith, 146 Va.
442, 132 S.E. 839 (1926); 4B Michie's Jur. Contracts § 20 (1986); 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §
43 (1964)).
87. Piland, 672 F. Supp. at 247.
88. Id, The court held that when the offer is silent as to a required acceptance date, the
custom in the construction trade is 30 days.
89. Southwood Builders, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 235 Va. 164, 366 S.E.2d 104 (1988).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 166-67, 366 S.E.2d at 105.
55319891
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
general advanced the subcontractor -certain funds which were to
later be deducted from the subcontractor's progress payments.9 2
The subcontractor eventually defaulted, causing the general con-
tractor to submit claims to the subcontractor's surety.9 3 Because
the general had violated a provision of the principal contract when
it gave the subcontractor money for work not yet done and ap-
proved by the architect, the court held that the surety was excused
from paying the increased cost caused by the subcontractor's
default.9 4
Possibly the most far-reaching finding of the court was its reaf-
firmation of American Surety Co. v. Plank & Whitsett, Inc.. 5 In
not requiring a surety to show injury in order to discharge its duty
to pay, there is a strong risk that contractors who make a good
faith attempt to avoid the expense of terminating and replacing a
subcontractor will be liable for the expenses which should be cov-
ered by the surety. The effect of this is that general contractors
will not attempt to mitigate the damages caused by an inadequate
subcontractor because if the general contractor violates the princi-
pal contract he will be liable for all of the excess cost. Therefore, in
the future, the Virginia courts or legislature should consider imple-
menting the rule used by some other jurisdictions" and require a
surety to show injury to the extent any discharge from its obliga-
tions is granted.
When addressing conflicts between a contractor and subcontrac-
tor which develop over money owed, Virginia courts will normally
rely heavily on the contract between the parties. In J.W. Creech,
Inc. v. Norfolk Air Conditioning Corp.,97 the contract stated that
the subcontractor was responsible and liable for its work, including
losses from theft, injury, or damage, until such time as the work
was inspected and tested.98 Any controversy or questions were to
be settled by the architect.99 A controversy over payment from the
92. Id. at 167, 366 S.E.2d at 106.
93. Id. at 167-68, 366 S.E.2d at 106.
94. Id. at 169-70, 366 S.E.2d at 108.
95. 159 Va. 1, 165 S.E. 660 (1932). The court held that a surety does not have to show
prejudice to its interests when there has been a material deviation from the principal
contract.
96. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 225 (1988). The court
held that in federal government contracts, the surety will only be discharged to the extent
the deviation from the contract actually injured the surety.
97. 237 Va. 320, 377 S.E.2d 605 (1989).
98. Id. at 324, 377 S.E.2d at 607.
99. Id.
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repair and replacement of part of the air conditioning unit arose
between the contractor and the subcontractor. 100 The court strictly
followed the terms of the contract, holding that the subcontractor
was liable for the damage since the equipment in question had not
yet been accepted and the architect had determined the subcon-
tractor was at fault.10'
When a subcontractor brings an action to collect unpaid fees,
requisition slips for payment which have been approved by the su-
pervising architect on the payment and the general contractor are
evidence, though not determinative, of the completeness and qual-
ity of the subcontractor's work.0 2 A subcontractor who prevails in
an action to collect fees still owed is also entitled to delay interest
from the general contractor running from the date when payment
would ordinarily have been due the subcontractor even if interest
was not contemplated in the contract. 03
E. Privity of Contract Restrictions
Privity of contract remains a vibrant and important concept in
Virginia construction law. 04 Privity of contract between parties is
still a necessary prerequisite for recovery of purely economic loss
in Virginia. 105 In Blake Construction, Inc. v. Alley,'0 6 the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, through separate contracts, hired a general
contractor to build an office building and an architectural firm to
design and supervise the construction. 01 The general contractor
brought an action against the architects, alleging they negligently
performed certain duties existing under the owner-architect con-
tract.10 8 The court, in interpreting section 8.01-223 of the Code of
Virginia, 0 9 held that absent a contractual duty between the con-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Sweeny Co. v. Engineers-Construction, Inc., 823 F.2d 805, 808-11 (4th Cir. 1987).
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit approved of the District Court for Eastern
Virginia's admittance of requisition slips into evidence. The case was reversed and re-
manded on other grounds.
103. J.W. Creech, Inc., 237 Va. at 325, 377 S.E.2d at 609.
104. See Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling, & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 374 S.E.2d
55 (1988); Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 233 Va. 31, 353 S.E.2d 724 (1987).
105. Blake Constr. Co., 233 Va. at 33-34, 353 S.E.2d at 726.
106. 233 Va. 31, 353 S.E.2d 724 (1987).
107. Id. at 32, 353 S.E.2d at 725.
108. Id. at 32-33, 353 S.E.2d at 725.
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223 (Repl. Vol. 1984). This section provides, "in cases not pro-
vided for in § 8.2-318 where recovery of damages for injury to person, including death, or to
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tractor and architect, the contractor could not recover in tort for
purely economic loss. 110 The Supreme Court of Virginia in Blake
Construction opined that section 8.01-223 is expressly limited to
injuries to person and property."'
The privity requirement for recovery of a purely economic loss
in tort extends to all the parties involved in the construction. In
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling, & Neal Architects, Inc.,"2 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that the homeowner-plaintiff had no
cause of action against the architect and pool contractor that negli-
gently installed a pool resulting in damage to the plaintiff's
house.1 1 3 The court based its holding on the fact that the defend-
ant architect and pool contractor had been hired by the general
contractor, not the homeowners. 4
F. Mechanic's Liens
In Virginia, the mechanic's lien is an important tool for protect-
ing the interests of general contractors, subcontractors, and sub-
subcontractors.1 Although the Virginia General Assembly has ex-
pressly recognized the waiver of a mechanic's lien," 6 it is such a
valuable and substantial right that the Supreme Court of Virginia
has on several occasions refused to enforce a waiver of mechanic's
lien unless it is express or clearly implied."1 This prevents contrac-
property resulting from negligence is sought, lack of privity between the parties shall be no
defense."
Section 8.2-318 of the Code of Virginia provides:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendants shall be no defense in any action
brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for breach of
warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not
purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manu-
facturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by
the goods ...
Id. § 8.2-318 (Add. Vol. 1965).
110. Blake Constr. Co., 233 Va. at 34, 353 S.E.2d at 726.
111. Id. The court explained that section 8.01-223 is in derogation of the common law and
therefore must be strictly construed.
112. 236 Va. 419, 374 S.E.2d 55 (1988).
113. Id. at 425, 374 S.E.2d at 58.
114. Id.
115. See Ulrich, VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA: MECHANICS' AND MATERIAL MEN'S LIEN 5-6
(1985).
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3(c) (Repl. Vol. 1986).
117. McMerit Constr. Co. v. Knightsbridge Dev. Co., 235 Va. 368, 374, 367 S.E.2d 512,
515 (1988) (citing VNB Mortgage Corp. v. Lone Star Indus., 215 Va. 366, 371, 209 S.E.2d
909, 914 (1974)); see also United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 233 Va. 476, 357 S.E.2d
509 (1987). The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that for a waiver of mechanic's liens to be
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tors, subcontractors, and sub-subcontractors from being manipu-
lated by owners into unknowingly waiving mechanic's lien rights.
The important status of mechanic's liens was recently reaffirmed
in Donohoe Construction Co. v. Mount Vernon Associations.118
There the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the filing of a mem-
orandum of mechanic's lien constituted a judicial proceeding.119 As
long as the words employed in the memorandum are relevant and
pertinent to the case, the memorandum is absolutely privileged. 120
Despite the important nature of mechanic's liens, courts tend to
strictly construe the code provision governing the liens.121 Thus, in
United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs National Bank, 22 the Supreme
Court of Virginia applied section 43-4 of the Code of Virginia 123
and held time barred certain mechanic's liens resulting from con-
struction contracts entered into before the effective date of the
amended section (July 1, 1980).124 The court in Rosser v. Cole,125
likewise strictly construed the section of the Code of Virginia
granting mechanic's lien rights for work done12  and declared a
road builder's mechanic's lien defective for not strictly following
the statute.12
valid and binding, it must be supported by consideration. United Masonry, Inc. at 483, 357
S.E.2d at 513.
118. 235 Va. 531, 369 S.E.2d 857 (1988).
119. Id. at 538-39, 369 S.E.2d 861.
120. Id. at 539, 369 S.E.2d at 861. In Donohoe, plaintiff filed a suit alleging that the de-
fendants' filing of a mechanic's lien was invalid and that it slandered the plaintiff's title to
the property in question and was an abuse of process.
121. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1 to -23.2 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
122. 233 Va. 476, 357 S.E.2d 509 (1987).
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1986). This section provides in pertinent part:
A general contractor, or any other lien claimant under sections 43-7 and 43-9, in or-
der to perfect the lien given by section 43-3, shall file at any time after the work is
commenced or material furnished, but not later than ninety days from the last day of
the month in which he last performs labor or furnishes material, but in no event later
than ninety days from the time such building, structure or railroad is completed, or
the work thereon otherwise terminated . . . . The time limitations set forth herein
shall apply to all labor performed or materials furnished on construction commenced
on or after July 1, 1980.
Id.
124. United Masonry, 233 Va. at 480-81, 357 S.E.2d at 511-12.
125. Rosser v. Cole, No. 870330, slip op. (Va. Apr. 21, 1989).
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3 (RepI. Vol. 1986).
127. Rosser, No. 870330, slip op. at 4.
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G. Damages
In Virginia, the plaintiff in a construction law action has the
burden of proving that the damages suffered were a direct result of
the defendant's breach of contract. 28 If there is no casual relation-
ship between the breach of contract and the damages sought, then
there can be no recovery. 29 This is a logical rule which protects
architects, contractors, subcontractors, and even owners from hav-
ing to pay damages for losses which would have occurred with or
without a breach of contract on the potential defendant's part.
Once the relationship between the plaintiff's damages and the
defendant's breach of contract has been established, the plaintiff
still has the burden of proving what damages he suffered as a re-
sult of the breach. 30 The plaintiff is not, however, under a burden
to conclusively prove the extent of his or her losses.' 3 ' In most con-
struction cases, the trier of fact is capable of examining the facts
and figures and giving a reasonable estimate of the damage in-
curred by the plaintiff."32 This rule is necessary because in many
cases centering around construction projects, while a trier of fact
may be able to give a reasonable estimate of damages, it would
place too great a burden on a plaintiff to force a plaintiff to prove
actual damages with absolute certainty."'
128. See Haas & Broyules Excavators, Inc. v. Ramey Bros. Excavating Co., 233 Va. 231,
235, 355 S.E.2d 312, 315 (1987). In Haas, the issue was whether a contractor was liable to its
subcontractor for damages the subcontractor suffered when it had its machinery repos-
sessed. The contractor was supposed to have paid certain sums to the subcontractor's credi-
tors but failed to do so. The Supreme Court of Virginia overruled the trial court and found
that even if the payment had been made as required, the machinery would have still been
repossessed by the creditor. Therefore, the breach on the part of the contractor was not
directly responsible for the damages and the plaintiff could not recover. Id. at 233-37, 335
S.E.2d at 314-15.
129. Id. at 236, 355 S.E.2d at 315 (quoting Manss-Owens Co. v. Owens & Son, 129 Va.
183, 202, 105 S.E. 543, 549 (1921)).
130. Nelson v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 228, 251, 368 S.E.2d 239, 252 (1988).
131. The "absolute certainty as to the amount of the damages is not essential when the
existence of loss has been established." Id. (citing Pebble Bldg. Co. v. Hopkins, Inc., 223 Va.
188, 191, 288 S.E.2d 437, 438 (1982) (quoting Wyckoff Pipe & Creosoting Co. v. Saunders,
175 Va. 512, 518, 9 S.E.2d 318, 321 (1940))).
132. See, e.g., Nelson, 235 Va. at 251, 368 S.E.2d at 252. The court has on occasion lim-
ited recovery of damages, when the cost to complete the contract, or repair what has been
done, would greatly outweigh any benefits received. See Lochaven Co. v. Master Pools, in
which the court refused to award damages in a case where a pool would have to be de-
stroyed to adequately repair it. 233 Va. 537, 544, 357 S.E.2d 534, 538-39 (1987).
133. For example, in Nelson, while it would have been extremely difficult to show actual
damages of a certain amount, the court upheld the use of tools such as industry manuals to
assist in the reasonable estimate of damages. 235 Va. at 250, 368 S.E.2d at 252.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the past two years, the judiciary of Virginia has consistently
limited liability to those in privity of contract. Additionally, the
court continues to disfavor the enforcement of contract language
which deviates from statute or generally accepted customs of the
construction industry unless the relevant language is expressly
worded and very specific in it intent. In those instances where the
contract language has been specific in its intent, the courts have
enforced "no damages for delay" clauses and "differing site condi-
tion" disclaimer clauses. The courts have also affirmatively ruled
that expert testimony is required to establish a breach of the stan-
dard of care in cases involving architectural malpractice.
Given the pervasive changes made in the standard form con-
tracts of the AIA in 1987, these issues are likely to be addressed
anew in the upcoming year as disputes arising under these con-
tracts make their way to the courts.
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